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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, emissions-trading markets-mainly in the
form of cap-and-trade programs regulated by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-have become a leading
federal policy mechanism in the United States for achieving
reductions in pollution. For at least a few major air pollutants,
most notably nitrous oxides (NOx) and sulfur dioxide (SO2)
emissions from fossil fuel power plants, markets have
supplemented traditional command-and-control regulation as a
major regulatory tool. Cap-and-trade also has been advanced as a
likely vehicle for regulating greenhouse gases from a broad range
of sources.'
One key advantage of an emissions-trading system over
command-and-control regulation is the reduction in costs made
possible by shifting compliance burdens to those facilities with the
lowest costs of compliance. This reduction in compliance costs
should, in turn, allow an emissions-trading program to achieve
greater emissions reductions than a command-and-control system.
Similarly, allowing the banking of allowances-that is,
allowing sources to save excess allowances for future time
periods-increases the efficiency of an emissions-trading program
by shifting reductions to lower-cost time periods and smoothing
price variations between different allowance vintages. Banking
also encourages early reductions in emissions and early
improvements in air quality.2
Because emissions allowances convey certain rights, it is
important that emissions-trading programs maintain clear and
consistent rules on the use of allowances in order to limit
uncertainty and assure a smoothly functioning market.3 After the
1 See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th
Cong. (2009). Commonly known as Waxman-Markey, this bill would have
created a nationwide cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emissions.
2 See generally HARRISON FELL ET AL., PRICES VERSUS QUANTITIES VERSUS
BANKABLE QUANTITIES (RFF Discussion Paper 08-32, 2008), available at
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-08-32-REV.pdf; see also Dallas
Burtraw, Appraisal of the SO2 Cap-and-Trade Market, in EMISSIONs TRADING:
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY'S NEW APPROACH 133, 139 (Richard F. Kosobud ed.,
2000).
3 Governing statutes and EPA regulations make it clear that its emissions-
trading programs do not convey formal property rights. See infra note 5 and
accompanying text.
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basic rules for an emissions-trading program are in place, changes
by regulators in the rules governing the use of allowances can
significantly affect the certainty and credibility of the emissions-
trading programs and the value of allowances. Such changes may
lead to undesirable market behavior, including an emissions
increase as sources use up or dump their banked allowances. In
addition, such changes also may undermine the credibility of other
trading programs within the jurisdiction of the regulator.
The treatment of banked allowances in the transition from one
emissions-trading program to a more stringent trading program
creates a similar challenge for regulators. If a decision is made to
terminate an existing program without the transfer of banked
allowances (or their expected economic value in some other form)
to the new program, sources will have an incentive to use their
banked allowances-increasing their emissions-in the waning
months of the existing program. Sources will also be unlikely to
make early reductions to smooth the transition to the new program.
Thus, it is important for the regulator to consider the consequences
of decisions regarding banked allowances made during the
transition in order to preserve well-functioning markets within the
existing and new trading programs.
These same considerations are also important when new
markets are created. Regulators have sometimes created incentives
for "early reductions" by allowing sources to generate credits for
additional allowances in the new program. Allowing these credits
to be transferred into the new program can smooth the transition
by reducing uncertainty and providing a "thicker" market.
These issues are important in large part because transitions
between trading markets are frequent. Caps on emissions generally
have been tightened over time as new information about the
adverse effects from pollutants has become known or costs of
control have declined. The tightening of caps and expansion of
programs' geographic scope has resulted in new programs with
new sets of rules. Court decisions and broader policy changes also
have spurred creation of new programs that supplant or modify
existing ones. In all these transitions, treatment of banked
allowances has been an issue.
This Article examines the several transitions between NOx
emissions-trading markets created by EPA regulation: Part III.A
discusses the start-up of the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
NO, Budget Program, and the 2003 transition from the OTC NOx
Imaged with Permission from NYU Environmental Law Journal
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Budget Program to the NOx SIP Call; Part III.B discusses the 2009
transition from the SIP Call to the seasonal NOx market in the
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), and the creation in CAIR of a
new annual NOx market. In addition, Part IV discusses the recent
transition in S0 2-trading programs between the Clean Air Act
(CAA) Title IV program created by Congress to the CAIR
program created by the EPA. In Part V, e also more briefly discuss
further transitions that would take place if either the EPA's
proposed replacement to CAIR (the Transport Rule) or new
pollution control legislation currently under consideration (the "3P
bill") were implemented.
In most of these transitions, the newer markets included
stricter emissions caps than their predecessors. This creates a
fundamental tension between the rights and value associated with
banked allowances and the environmental goal of reduced
emissions. If banked allowances are used in the new, stricter
program, emissions will be greater than desired in the short term
until those banked allowances are drawn down. If the new caps are
substantially stricter than the old ones, delays before emissions
match the new caps will be perceived as problematic and will
create pressure to reduce or eliminate these "excess" allowances.
As discussed above, doing so has consequences for the stability
and effectiveness of the market (and possibly other markets).
Striking the right balance is not easy, and the EPA has faced
this issue through all the transitions between markets discussed in
this paper. Though the problems have been consistent, the EPA's
response has not. When the EPA has restricted the exchange of
banked allowances, when it has revealed its plans for exchange
only after banking decisions have been made, or when courts have
blocked EPA plans for simple transitions, market distortions-very
high or very low allowance prices and price volatility-have been
the result. If EPA's handling of transitions in the NOx and SO2
markets leads to uncertainty for regulated entities about the
credibility of allowance banking, these actions will adversely
affect market behavior in the future, reducing the effectiveness and
cost savings of market-based programs.
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I. EMIssioNs-TRADING PROGRAMS AND BANKING OF ALLOWANCES
A. Allowance Banking
As many scholars have identified, creation of property rights
is associated with more efficient use of resources. The CAA and
EPA regulations explicitly state, however, that the emissions
allowances created do not convey property rights.5 One way to
understand allowances, therefore is to view them as carrying some
(but not all) of the rights in the property bundle. For example,
holders can exclude others from using allowances they hold. But
the statutory provisions and government agency decisions that
create allowances limit allowance holders' rights in some respects.
More precisely, emissions allowances have all the traditional rights
associated with property except one-the right of owners to be
compensated if allowances are either seized or rendered valueless
by government action. Takings Clause claims based on emissions
allowances will fail.6 In other respects, allowances are
4 See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *2-11 (1766); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 36
(5th ed. 1998) (stating that "legal protection of property rights creates incentives
to exploit resources efficiently").
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C § 765lb(f) (2006) (stating that a Title IV SO2
allowance "does not constitute a property right."); see also Clean Air Interstate
Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162, 25,345 (proposed Mar. 10, 2005) [hereinafter CAIR]
("A CAIR NOx allowance does not constitute a property right.").
6 Courts would be highly unlikely to treat them as property, for example, by
finding that program changes reducing or eliminating their value violate the
Takings Clause of the Constitution. For a more detailed discussion of Takings
Clause issues as they relate to emissions permits, see Susan A. Austin, Tradable
Emissions Programs: Implications Under the Takings Clause, 26 ENVTL. L. 323,
352 (1996) ("Even if the government is not careful in drafting statutes and
regulations to prevent property rights in tradable emissions permits from vesting,
courts will probably apply a presumption against vesting and the government
will not be liable for a takings claim. Moreover, precedent suggests that a
company's reliance on tradable emissions permits will not be considered
'reasonable' in light of the government's traditional authority to regulate
pollution. The potential for successful takings claims based on diminution in land
value is greater because the law is in flux. Under current law, however, a takings
claim probably would not be successful even if the government repossessed the
permits or if the permits became so expensive that some companies had to shut
down."). Here, Congress has been careful in drafting the relevant statute-the
CAA explicitly specifies that Title IV allowances are not property. The statute
does not explicitly protect EPA-created allowances such as those for NOx
emissions in CAIR, but the agency does attempt to do so in the rule. In any case
they are likely protected from takings claims by the general principles Austin
notes.
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indistinguishable from property. Allowances, walk, talk, and quack
like ducks, but Congress (and EPA) have emphatically declared
that they are not ducks. 7
However emissions allowances are characterized, the design
of emissions markets governs how they can be used and
exchanged. An important element of this design is whether
allowances can be banked-that is, whether they can be saved for
use in the future. Banking has straightforward advantages. It lets
sources reduce emissions in one period and save their unused
allowances for future time periods or sell to others for their use,
leading to cost savings and greater efficiency.8 It also stabilizes
allowance markets by providing a pool of allowances that can be
used in periods when allowances are relatively scarce and by
reducing price differences that would otherwise exist between
different allowance vintages.9 Another advantage offered by
This is a clever statutory move. While Congress obviously could not
overrule the Takings Clause in legislation, declaring that allowances are not
property places them outside the clause's protection.
Banking provides regulated sources with additional flexibility in timing
the installation of pollution control equipment. This flexibility provides cost
savings because the optimal path for replacement of equipment varies widely
across sources. In addition, it spreads out compliance projects and expenditures
over time rather than concentrating the demand for equipment, etc. at a single
point in time. See T. H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE 108 (2d ed. 2006); see also NAT'L. RESEARCH COUNCIL, AIR QUALITY
MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 207 (2004); A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL.,
MARKETS FOR CLEAN. AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM 282 (2000)
(estimating that the banking provisions in the Title IV SO2 cap-and-trade
program yielded a cost savings of $1.3 billion). In addition, electric utilities
operate under the principle that they must provide generation to meet demand.
Given the uncertainties associated with various external factors (e.g., periods of
extreme weather, shutdown of such critical units as nuclear power plants, and
increases in natural gas prices) that can affect the demand for electricity and
utility operations, electric utilities will seek to hold extra emissions allowances
above those required to cover current emissions to provide flexibility in meeting
future power demand.
9 See TIETENBERG, supra note 8, at 108 ("Banking also has the potential to
reduce price instability. Storing permits for unanticipated outcomes.. .can reduce
future uncertainty considerably."). Some observers have cited the very limited
temporal flexibility provided in California's RECLAIM program as one of the
factors contributing to the price instability in that market in 2000-2001. See
NAT'L. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 207; see also TIETENBERG, supra
note 8, at 114-15 (citing R. Godby et al., Experimental Test of Market Power in
Emission Trading Markets, in ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND MARKET
POWER (E. Petrakis et al., eds., 1999) (finding that banking virtually eliminated
price instability in laboratory experiments while scenarios in the experiment
where banking was not allowed exhibited substantial price instability)).
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systems that allow for banking of allowances is that by giving
emitting sources with banked allowances a vested interest in the
control program, such systems may more effectively align the
interests of regulators and emissions sources. This should
contribute to the long-term viability and political acceptability of
the control program.' 0
Although the economic case for banking is compelling, the
environmental benefits are less certain. If banking has the effect of
spreading emissions across time periods in a fairly even way, then
there are likely to be environmental benefits. If, on the other hand,
banked allowances make it possible for emissions in the future to
exceed the cap, then there may be adverse effects on air quality.I'
Environmental advocates, some state environmental agencies, and
the EPA itself have at one time or another expressed significant
concerns with allowing banking for this reason. 12
Actual experience, though, suggests that banking has
promoted early reductions that have resulted in a reasonably
efficient pattern of emissions (with reduced temporal clustering).' 3
In addition, the absence of banking in a program does not assure
10 See NAT'L. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 202.
" See TIETENBERG, supra note 8, at 108 ("Allowing [banking and/or
borrowing] can either ameliorate or exacerbate pollutant concentrations. If firms
use the flexibility to disperse emissions through time, concentrations will be
diminished. However, if this flexibility results in clustered emissions,
concentrations will be worsened.").
12 See, e.g., Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain
States in the Ozone Transport Assesment Group Region for Purposes of
Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,430 (Oct. 27,
1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51) [herinafter Ozone Rulemaking] (stating
that "[t]he EPA also requested comment on options for managing the use of
banked allowances in order to limit the potential for emissions to be significantly
higher than budgeted levels because of banking."). States facing ozone and
particulate matter pollution have also expressed concerns about banked
allowances. See Detailed Comments from the Northeast States for Coordinated
Air Use Management (NESCA UM) on the U S. EPA 's Supplemental Proposal for
the Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone
(Clean Air Interstate Rule) at 3-4 (2004), available at
http://www.nescaum.org/documents/comments04O726iaqr-attacha.pdf
(documenting comments from states suggesting that the EPA more aggressively
reduce the value of banked SO2 allowances in CAIR). To some extent, the
perceived problem arises from a short time horizon-even if banking is allowed,
emissions over the entire period controlled by the emissions-trading system
cannot exceed the sum of the annual caps.
13 See TIETENBERG, supra note 8, at 114 (citing various evaluations of the
Title IV S02 program).
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an inviolate cap. Adjustments to California's RECLAIM program
in response to the electricity crisis of 2000-2001 illustrates the
problem. The RECLAIM program had very limited temporal
flexibility and little in the way of stored allowances to provide a
safety margin for the crisis, In response to the crisis, California
regulators administering the program created a "mitigation fund"
that injected an estimated additional one million tons of
allowances into the market.' 4 If regulators respond to short-term
volatility and other events that cause political or economic
pressure by allowing emitters to breach emissions caps, then any
environmental benefits from eschewing banking disappear.
Emissions-trading programs, however, do change over time.
Most include an emissions cap that declines, usually in stages that
are disclosed when the program is initiated. Political changes and
new information (on emissions, abatement costs, or harms from
pollutants) may also lead to changes or even the creation of
entirely new programs. A tension exists between these changed
environmental goals and the expectations banked allowances
create. If allowances banked in one version of an emissions-trading
system cannot be used in subsequent revisions, or if program
changes otherwise undermine their value, these expectations will
also be undermined
In transitions between trading programs where existing stocks
of banked allowances threaten the maintenance of the cap in future
years, a regulator could end the existing emissions-trading
program (rendering allowances useless) or limit use of banked
allowances (reducing their value). The way in which regulators
handle these transitions is critical because allowances only retain
value to the extent that regulators credibly promise not to
undermine them. If those that hold allowances no longer believe
they will be useful in the fiture, they will not make continuing
early reductions in emissions, and the efficiency benefits of
banking will be unrealized.
It is even possible that these effects may carry over between
different emissions-trading programs with the same repeat players.
For example, EPA administers most emissions-trading programs
14 See STEPHEN P. HOLLAND & MICHAEL R. MOORE, WHEN TO POLLUTE,
WHEN TO ABATE? INTERTEMPORAL PERMIT USE IN THE Los ANGELES NOx
MARKET 5-6 (Univ. of Cal. Energy Inst. Ctr. for the Study of Energy Mkts.,
Working Paper No. 178, 2008), available at
http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDF/csemwpl78.pdf.
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for various pollutants in the United States, and the predominant
emissions sources in most of these programs are similar-large
fossil fuel electricity generation plants and some industrial
facilities. EPA actions that undermine the value of banked
allowances in one program might lead a rational emitter to predict
that the EPA will behave similarly with respect to other programs
and markets and adjust its trading and banking behavior
accordingly.
Decisions by regulators that reduce or, especially, eliminate
the value of banked allowances are not problematic in that they are
"unfair"-a stricter cap or other changes to a trading system are
arguably no more or less fair than institution of a cap for a
previously unrestricted pollutant in the first place. Both are likely
to undercut the value of existing investments. But an unanticipated
government action that substantially reduces the value of existing
allowances risks damaging the function of emissions-trading
markets themselves. In short, the issue is not fairness but
efficiency-what is problematic is the potential effect of such
alterations on market-participant behavior (along with the political
impact of reduced participant buy-in). Unanticipated government
interference with banked allowances can also have direct impacts
that go beyond reduced efficiency: as described above, when
participants believe that banked allowances will disappear or lose
value in the future, they are less likely to make early reductions
and bank credits and more likely to dump allowances already
banked in a way that increases emissions.15 If this happens, a
trading program will be less effective in achieving the expected
abatement benefits at lowest cost. Spillover effects between repeat
players in multiple markets may extend these adverse effects to
other trading programs.' 6 In short, the more emitters come to
believe their banked allowances will lose their value due to policy
changes, the less likely they are to bank; at the extreme, if they
" Early reduction (and, conversely, "dumping") of emissions allowances
matters. Early reductions mean early health benefits. Since the relationship
between pollution and health is often nonlinear, emissions "spikes" over a short
time period, particularly of precursor pollutants like NOx and SO2, can lead to
disproportionately large health and welfare impacts.
16 See, e.g., BArd Harstad & Gunnar S. Eskeland, Trading for the Future:
Signaling in the Permit Markets, 94 J. PUB. ECoN. 749, 754 (2010), available at
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/harstad/htm/trading.pdf (finding
that economic distortions associated with government intervention in emissions
markets are exacerbated in scenarios with repeat players).
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believe banked allowances are likely to lose all their value they
will not bank at all. If this happens, the efficiency (and, indirectly,
environmental) benefits of banking are lost.
An important and underemphasized element of regulatory
design during changes in emissions-trading systems is therefore
the need to minimize disruption by maximizing confidence among
participants that the rights and value embodied by banked
allowances will be preserved as much as possible. This does not
mean that changing conditions or new information on risks should
not lead to program changes, some of which affect banked
allowance value. But environmental goals should be balanced with
expectations about banked allowances. The next sections examine
the extent to which transitions between U.S. emissions-trading
programs over the last decade have met this goal.
It is important to be precise about what we mean when we
refer to the value of banked allowances. The expected value of a
banked allowance in the transition to a new cap-and-trade program
depends on the exchange ratio-that is, the number of allowances
required in exchange for one ton of emissions-and the expected
price at which the allowance could be sold (generally, the marginal
cost of control) under the new program with a more stringent cap.
An exchange ratio other than 1:1 between two programs may not
lead to a difference in allowance value: if two old allowances must
be exchanged for each new one, but the new allowances are twice
as costly because of a tighter emissions cap, there is no change in
total allowance value.' 7 With one exception, the transitions
between EPA emissions trading have had either 1:1 exchange
ratios for allowances banked before the transitions were
announced, or have not allowed any exchange at all, simplifying
these issues greatly. Our discussion below will distinguish between
changes to the exchange rate in terms of the number of allowances
required to per ton of emissions and the expected value of an
allowance.
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B. The History of U.S. Emissions-Trading Markets
1. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
The history of emissions trading in the United States is well-
documented elsewhere. 8 The general story is that by the late
1980s, dissatisfaction with the costs associated with traditional
command-and-control regulation paired with a realization that
substantial environmental goals remained unreached led to
compromises in Congress. These compromises took legislative
shape in the 1990 amendments to the CAA. The amendments
explicitly created one emissions-trading market, the Title IV Acid
Rain Program for SO2. During the 1990s, the states and the EPA
created additional trading programs for NOx using CAA authority.
While emissions-trading systems for greenhouse gases are the
most frequent topic of current discussion, and the market for SO2
created by the 1990 amendments to the CAA is the most well-
known current market, markets for NOx emissions have the most
complex regulatory history.
2. EPA Emissions-Trading Markets
The primary driver for the initial NOx control programs-the
OTC NOx Budget Program and the NOx SIP Call-was
nonattainment of the ozone National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) in a number of major metropolitan areas in
the eastern United States.19 For these nonattainment areas, the
long-range transport of ozone and NOx-a precursor pollutant in
the formation of ozone-was a key factor contributing to
widespread nonattainment of the ozone NAAQS during the
1 See, e.g., DALLAS BURTRAW & SARAH JO SZAMBELAN, U.S. EMisSIoNs
TRADING MARKETS FOR SO 2 AND NOx (RFF Discussion Paper 09-40, 2009),
available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-09-40.pdf; see
generally ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 8.
19 See EPA, NITROGEN DIOXIDE, http://epa.gov/air/nitrogenoxides/ (last
visited Sept. 24, 2009). The EPA listed ground-level ozone as a "criteria
pollutant" in 1978 and has established successively more stringent NAAQS for
it. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006). Under the CAA, each state is charged with
meeting the NAAQS set by the EPA. § 7410(a)(1). States or areas that fail to do
so are in "nonattainment" and are subject to penalties and increasingly strict
regulation. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (stating that plans to meet the NAAQS set by
the EPA must prohibit nonattainment); see also § 7410(m) (stating that failure to
meet plan requirements can result in sanctions).
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summertime in the eastern United States.20
In 2005, EPA adopted the Clean Air Interstate Rule in an
attempt to further reduce SO2 and NOx emissions because of
concerns with meeting the fine particulate matter (PM2.5) NAAQS
in the eastern United States (both pollutants are precursors in the
formation of fine PM). 2 1 CAIR established two new cap-and-trade
programs for NOx. First, CAIR incorporated a seasonal cap-and-
trade program that in many respects was an extension of the NOx
SIP Call program to reduce summertime ozone. Second, CAIR
created an annual NOx cap-and-trade program to reduce the
formation of fine PM. 22
CAIR also established a new SO2 cap-and-trade program in
the eastern United States to reduce the interstate transport of SO2
as a precursor in the formation of fine PM.23 This SO2 program
substantially modified-and in many states effectively replaced-
the historic (and storied) Title IV program created by the 1990
CAA amendments. The DC Circuit struck down CAIR in 2008,
throwing the future of NOx and SO2 trading markets into some
confusion.24 Congress and the EPA recently have moved to
address this confusion, but it is as yet uncertain what form the
future program will take-placing us once again on the cusp of a
major transition to a new trading program.
As described in detail in the sections that follow, this
succession of new programs with stricter caps and broader reach
provides a fertile history of transitions that provide the basis for
our analysis in this paper.
This series of markets and the transitions between them are
shown in Figure 1, and described in detail in the sections that
follow.
20 More stringent NOx emissions regulations on stationary sources were
adopted in the CAA amendments, and while these restrictions did result in
additional reduction in ozone concentrations, many areas were projected to
continue to be in nonattainment. See BURTRAW & SZAMBELAN, supra note 18, at
16.
21 CAIR, supra note 5, at 25,162 (finding that "28 States and the District of
Columbia contribute significantly to nonattainment of the national ambient air
quality standards (NAAQS) for fine particles (PM2.5) and/or 8-hour ozone in
downwind States").
22id
23 id
24 See generally North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(vacating CAIR for ignoring pertinent provisions of the CAA).
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Figure 1. Timeline of Major U.S. Emissions-Trading Markets
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II. BANKED ALLOWANCES AND PROGRAM TRANSITIONS: NOx
A. The OTC NOx Budget Program and the NOx SIP Call
1. The OTC NOx Budget Program
By the late 1980s, areas in the Northeast found compliance
with the NAAQS particularly problematic, in part because long-
range interstate transport of ozone made it impossible for
independent state-level regulation to adequately deal with the
problem.25 In recognition of this issue, the 1990 CAA amendments
created an Ozone Transport Commission charged with
recommending regional controls for the Northeast to the EPA. The
OTC covered 12 states-Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts,
Maryland, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Vermont-plus the
District of Columbia (see Figure 2).
25 See EPA OZONE TRANSPORT COMMISSION, NOx BUDGET PROGRAM: 1999-
2002 PROGRESS REPORT 2 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/
progress/docs/otcreport.pdf (hereinafter Progress Report). See also 63 Fed. Reg.
57,356, 57,360-61; BURTRAW & SZAMBELAN, supra note 18, at 16-17.
26 42 U.S.C. § 7511c (2006); see also Ozone Rulemaking, supra note 12, at
57,360.
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Figure 2. States included in the OTC and SIP Call Programs27
OTC and SIP Call NOx Budget Programs
OTC Trading States
Additinal SIP Call States
PrilStates
Upon the recommendation of the OTC, these states (with the
exception of Virginia) entered into the multi-phase NOx Budget
Program (hereinafter the OTC program) for NOx emissions
reductions from stationary sources, aimed at meeting the NAAQS
for ozone.28 Phase I of the OTC program began in 1995 and
required compliance with the 1990 CAA amendments' Reasonably
Available Control Technology (RACT) standards. 29  The
emissions-trading program was initiated in Phase II of the OTC
program beginning in 1999. It created seasonal (May 1-September
30) caps on NOx emissions beyond those imposed by RACT
standards.o Phase II of the OTC program operated between 1999
and 2002, before being superseded by the NOx SIP Call program in
2003 (See Figure 1 above). Phase II achieved additional reductions
beyond Phase I of roughly 70,000 tons in seasonal NOx
emissions." Phase III would have instituted a tighter emissions cap
27 EPA OZONE TRANSPORT COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 13.
2' BURTRAW & SZAMBELAN, supra note 18, at 17. See also EPA OZONE
TRANSPORT COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 1.
29 EPA OZONE TRANSPORT COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 3-4.
30 Id. at 4-5.
31 BURTRAW & SZAMBELAN, supra note 18, at 21. See also EPA OZONE
TRANSPORT COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 4. Phase I of the program-the
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in 2003 but was superseded by the EPA's NOx SIP Call program
discussed below.32
Market Structure
In the OTC Phase II emissions-trading program, states
distributed allowances up to the seasonal limit. Sources had to
show that they had one allowance for each ton of NOx emitted.
These allowances could be sold or, critically for purposes of this
analysis, banked for use in future years.33 Banked allowances
could be used on a one-to-one basis (that is, one allowance for one
ton of NOx emitted) exactly like current-vintage allowances,
subject to a set of restrictions called "progressive flow control"
(PFC). Under this system, if the volume of banked allowances
exceeded 10 percent of the total budget for a given year, PFC
would limit the amount of allowances that could be exchanged at a
one-to-one basis. Once this threshold was exceeded, further
banked allowances could still be used, but only on a two-to-one
basis.34 The purpose of PFC was to limit the extent to which
emissions exceeded the seasonal NOx cap due to a draw-down of
large amounts of banked allowances. While PFC is a somewhat
technical rule within the larger program, it is significant for an
analysis of banked allowances. Because PFC was triggered
throughout the course of the OTC program, banked allowances
generally traded at a discount of $150 to $250 per ton less than
current-vintage allowances, which could always be used on a one-
to-one basis.35
Allowance Prices during the OTC Program
In the months immediately preceding the transition into the
Phase II OTC NOx market, NOx allowance prices rose to more
than $5,000 per ton-a level well above the estimated marginal
technology-based RACT requirements-achieved a reduction of roughly
180,000 tons in seasonal NOx emissions before any emissions-trading system
was implemented.
32 EPA OZONE TRANSPORT COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 4-5.
3 Id. at 3.
34 Id. at 15-16.
See EPA, PROGRESSIVE FLOW CONTROL IN THE OTC NOx BUDGET
PROGRAM: ISSUES TO CONSIDER AT THE CLOSE OF THE 1999-2002 PERIOD 10
(2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/resource/docs/
flowcontrolOTC.pdf.
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cost of NOx control under Phase II of the program-because of
concerns that the utilities would not be able to install sufficient
control equipment to meet the emissions cap in 1999 (see Figure
3).36 The market in this period was relatively thin, with relatively
few transactions between different firms. However, additional
early-reduction allowances coming into the market in the spring of
1999 expanded supply, resulting in a drop in allowances prices to
around $1,000 per ton by the beginning of 2000. Prices for current-
vintage allowances largely settled-with the exception of a six-
month excursion up to $2,000 per ton in 2001-at a price
somewhat below $1,000 per ton through the end of the OTC
program.
Figure 3. OTC NOx Allowance Prices, 1998-200238
OTC NOx Allowance Price ($/ton, monthly average)
g -current Phase 2
K0- - - Banked Phase 2
$5,00- PL + Phase 3 (2003+) ++
J-B OTC NJoa Jan0 0 + + J
kan-98 Jarn-99 JAft-0 Jan-01 Jark-02
Th~!
~
3 Projections of NOx control costs for the program were on the order of
$1,500 per ton. ALEXANDER FARRELL, CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION,
REVIEW OF MARKET-BASED INCENTIVES FOR CONSIDERATION OF APPLICATIONS
IN CALIFORNIA 20 (2005), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/
2005publications/CEC-500-2005-025/CEC-500-2005-025.PDF.
1 See id.
38 ALEX FARRELL, NATIONAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY, NOx
EMISSION TRADING IN THE NORTHEAST: TRENDS AND OUTLOOK 10 (2002),
http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/proceedings/02/scr-sncr/Farrell.pdf.
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2. The NOx SIP Call
While the OTC program reduced NOx emissions, ozone levels
continued to be a problem-many areas were still unable to meet
the NAAQS. In 1995, the Ozone Transport Assessment Group
(OTAG), a state-EPA partnership, was created to review policy
options for further NOx emissions reductions.39 In 1997, the EPA
made a decision, based on new scientific evidence, to tighten the
NAAQS for ozone, adding to the challenge these areas faced in
complying with the NAAQS. While OTAG deliberations did not
result in an agreement between the parties, the EPA incorporated
analysis developed by OTAG into its review of CAA State
Implementation Plans (SIPs) for compliance with the ozone
NAAQS. In 1998, the EPA required 22 states, including all the
OTC states except Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, to
submit new SIPs that included plans for further NOx reductions
(see Figure 2).40 This action was termed the "NOx SIP Call."
Under the SIP Call, the EPA set a seasonal cap on each
participating states' NOx emissions from a specific set of
stationary sources. States were then given the flexibility to comply
with these caps however they might choose. 4 1 The EPA, however,
created a "model" emissions-trading program-the NO, Budget
Trading Program (NBP)-in the SIP Call rulemaking and
encouraged states to adopt it as a means to meet the caps set by the
EPA.42 Some regulated states challenged the SIP Call on a variety
of grounds, but the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
legality of the program in 2000 in Michigan v. EPA.4 3 Following
the litigation, the SIP Call rule was implemented for those states
that participated in the OTC program beginning in 2003,
effectively replacing the third phase of that program. States that
had not participated in the OTC program joined the SIP Call
program in June of 2004."
All the OTC Program states chose to participate in the EPA's
model emissions-trading program for the SIP Call. In many
3 Ozone Rulemaking, supra note 12, at 57,361.
40 Id. at 57,358.
41 id.
42 Id. at 57,456.
43 213 F.3d 663, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that the EPA did not
impermissibly intrude on the ability of states to create their own SIPs).
4 Burtraw & Szambelan, supra note 18, at 24.
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respects, this program was very similar to the emissions-trading
system under the OTC program. Allowances continued to be
allocated by states, caps were imposed annually for the May 1-
September 30 season, and PFC continued to limit the use of
banked allowances. The transition between the two programs was
complex, however, particularly with respect to banked allowances.
3. The OTC-SIP Call Transition
Banking and Early Reductions in the NOx SIP Call
In its NOx SIP Call, the EPA recognized the advantages of
allowing banking to provide flexibility, ease the costs of the
transition to a more stringent regulatory regime, and promote early
reductions. 45 At the same time, though, the agency was concerned
that banking could result in a significant increase in emissions
above the cap and jeopardize the NOx SIP Call goal of limiting
NOx emissions during the ozone season.4 6 As a result, the EPA
made two decisions severely restricting the transfer of banked
OTC allowances into the NBP.
First, the EPA limited the size of the Compliance Supplement
Pool (CSP) to 200,000 tons and the use of the CSP allowances to
the first two years of the program.4 7 Second, the agency also
45 See Ozone Rulemaking, supra note 12, at 57,428; The EPA also noted that
commentators provided several reasons for including a banking program: it
would encourage early and cost-saving emissions reductions, help to avoid end-
of-season emissions spikes (because unused emissions have value in future
years), encourage more expedient development of NO, emissions control
technology, and allow sources flexibility to save allowances in years when costs
are relatively low for use in high cost years when, for example, nuclear and
hydro capacity are more limited. Id. at 57,430.
46 Id. at 57,431 (the EPA states that "the flow control mechanism ...
discourages the 'excessive use' of banked allowances or credits by establishing
either an absolute limit on the number of banked allowances or credits that can
be used each season or a rate discounting the use of banked allowances or credits
over a given level." Because the flow control mechanism focused on the use of
credits over the entire ozone season, it was not well suited to address the real
problem-that is, episodic violations associated with hot weather that contribute
significantly to ozone formation.).
47 The Compliance Supplement Pool ("CSP") was created by the EPA as part
of the NOx SIP Call to address concerns that adequate NOx controls might not
be in place in the early years of the program and to help smooth the transition.
The CSP was comprised of 200,000 allowances in the NBP. States could
distribute their share of CSP allowances based on a showing of need and/or to
reward early reductions. See id. at 57,429.
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allocated the CSP to states in proportion to the emissions
reductions each state was required to achieve under the NOx SIP
Call. The EPA based this allocation on its view that the need for a
supplemental allocation was directly related to the size of the
reduction required.48 With more than 90 percent of CSP
allowances allocated to states outside the OTC (since most
emissions reductions would come in those newly-included states),
this decision placed a significant constraint on the transfer of
banked allowances between programs and limited the total transfer
of OTC banked allowances to roughly 25,000 tons.49
In addition, the EPA adopted a flow control provision nearly
identical to that in the OTC program.5 0 The flow control
restrictions applied when the use of banked allowances exceeded
10 percent of the ozone season budget. While states had some
flexibility, flow control measures under the NBP required sources
to give up two banked allowances for every ton of emissions when
the use of banked credits exceeded the 10 percent threshold.5 1 The
flow control provisions applied to all banked credits-including
banked CSP credits-at the beginning of the second year of the
program. 52
In making the transition through the CSP, the OTC states
placed additional limits in 2001 on the transfer of banked
allowances.5 3 In determining the pro-rata distribution of CSP
allowances, none of the OTC states allowed credit for 1999
vintage-year allowances. In addition, Pennsylvania did not allow
credit for 2000 vintage year NOx allowances. Finally, Maryland
used an early-reductions program as a basis for distributing CSP
allowances, instead of using banked OTC allowances. 54 As a
result, these OTC allowances became "use-or-lose" credits within
the OTC program. EPA reports that these were the predominant
source of allowances surrendered on a two-to-one basis under the
48 Id. at 57,429.
49 The NOx SIP Call therefore allowed-but did not require-the non-OTC
States to set up programs to grant early reduction credits. Id. at 57,432.
o Id. at 57,431.
5' EPA, NOx BUDGET TRADING PROGRAM REPORT: 2007 COMPLIANCE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RESULTS 26-27 (2008), http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progress/
docs/2007-NBP-Report.pdf.
52 See Ozone Rulemaking, supra note 12, at 57,431.
5 See Farrell, Review of Market Based Incentives, supra note 36, at 22.
54 See EPA, Progressive Flow Control in the OTC NOx Budget Program,
supra note 35, at 6.
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OTC PFC requirements.
The Transition from the OTC to the NOx SIP Call in Practice
The EPA established the requirements for the NBP in October
1998, six months before the OTC trading program began on May
1, 1999. Therefore, the details for the OTC-NBP transition were
already known before sources made their decisions on whether to
bank excess allowances in the OTC program.56 Over the 1999-
2002 period, sources in the OTC region continued to accumulate
OTC banked allowances even though the total bank substantially
exceeded the CSP allowances that could be transferred into the
NBP program. Even in the final year of the OTC program, sources
banked additional allowances (see Figure 4). In the end, the
transfer ratio in the OTC was on the order of nine OTC credits to
two NBP allowances.
Figure 4. NOx emissions and budgets, OTC NBP 1990-200357
I
III
5s See id. at 7.
56 The NOx SIP Call was the subject of litigation, including a claim that EPA
should not have restricted the size of the CSP. This challenge was rejected by the
D.C. Circuit. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 694.
17 For source data, see EPA, 2002 OTC NOx BUDGET PROGRAM COMPLIANCE
REPORT 2 (2003), http://www.otcair.org/document.asp?fview=Report#.
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Although the transition between these two programs did not
preserve a one-to-one exchange value for OTC allowances, the fact
that participants were aware before the program started that the
exchange rate would be substantially less than one-to-one means
that, in general, the terms of exchange were established in
advance, at least at the level of federal policy, and that settled
expectations were not significantly disrupted in the market. Some
disruption of expectations did occur, however, with the decision by
the OTC to prohibit the use of early-vintage allowances in the
conversion to CSP allowances and with the decisions by
Pennsylvania and Maryland to further limit the eligibility of OTC
banked allowances for conversion to CSP allowances.
Allowance Prices during the OTC-SIP Call Transition
A review of allowance prices in the transition period suggest
that prices behaved consistently with the constraints placed by the
PFC requirements on the use of banked allowances in the OTC
program and by the CSP requirements governing the transfer of
banked allowances to the NOx SIP Call program. During the final
year of the OTC program, the prices for 1999 vintage allowances
were roughly 60 percent of the price for then-current (2002)
vintage allowances (see Figure 5). This discount reflects the
decision by the OTC states to prohibit the use of 1999-vintage
allowances in determining the allocation of CSP allowances for
use in the NBP. As a result, banked 1999-vintage allowances
became "use-or-lose."--emitters had to use them before the end of
the OTC program, and then only at 2:1 since PFC had been
triggered. While the 2000 and 2001 vintage allowances also were
subject to the PFC use ratio, they could also be used in an
exchange for CSP allowances for use in the 2003 NOx SIP Call
market, and saved for a future year in which PFC might not be
triggered.
5 It is true that Pennsylvania did not provide CSP credit for 2000 vintage
NOx allowances. See EPA, Progressive Flow Control in the OTC NOx Budget
Program, supra note 35, at 6. These allowances could still be exchanged for CSP
credit elsewhere. Reccall that the SIP Call program, implemented through EPA's
Model Rule and state SIPs based on it, allowed interstate trading. See Ozone
Rulemaking, supra note 12, at 57,456-58. Pennsylvania sources could therefore
trade their allowances to sources in other states that would then be able to
exchange any Pennsylvania allowances they held for CSP allowances,
circumventing Pennsylvania's CSP restriction.
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Holders of banked 2000- and 2001-vintage allowances
therefore faced a choice: convert those allowances into 2002
allowances at the PFC ratio, or convert them into 2003 allowances
at the CSP ratio. Because 2003-vintage allowances were trading in
the forward markets at $4,000-$6,000 per ton in 2002, the 2000-
and 2001-vintage OTC allowances traded in the range of $700 per
ton, a price slightly lower but roughly commensurate with the CSP
exchange ratio.
Conversion to 2003 allowances also granted more flexibility
since the 2003 vintage allowances freed up by use of CSP
allowances could be banked for future SIP Call years. Finally, the
2002 vintage allowances traded at $800-$900 per ton, a price
consistent with the marginal cost of control to meet the then-
current OTC seasonal NOx cap.
Figure 5. NOx Seasonal Allowance Prices, 2001-2002 5
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Figure 6. Seasonal NOx Allowance Prices, 2000-200560
The other key feature of the data in this transition period is the
much higher price for 2003 allowances in the initial months of the
SIP Call (see Figure 6). Prices in the range of $4,000-$6,000 per
ton substantially exceeded the EPA's estimate of the marginal cost
of NOx control at the cap levels in the program. In discussing these
higher-than-expected prices, market observers have suggested that
they reflected the uncertainty in the market over the ability of the
regulated entities to get adequate NOx control into place for the
2003 ozone season and the availability of NOx allowances for
compliance in 2003.61 As noted above, the CSP early-reduction
incentive program only provided roughly 25,000 tons of additional
NOx allowances in the OTC states.62 It is likely that a more liberal
approach to the transfer of banked allowances between the OTC
6o Data provided by Gary Hart (on file with author). Dotted lines represent
periods where limited price data are available.
61 See Farrell, Review ofMarket Based Incentives, supra note 36, at 22.
62 When the EPA issued the final NOx SIP Call rule in 1998, the 2003 start
date for the program applied to all the covered states. However, challenges to the
EPA rule by the non-OTC states delayed the start date for those states by one
year. Since most of the 200,000 CSP allowances were allocated to the non-OTC
states, these allowances were not available until 2004. EPA, EVALUATING OZONE
CONTROL PROGRAMS IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES: Focus ON THE NO,
BUDGET TRADING PROGRAM 9 (2004), http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/
docs/ozonenbp.pdf.
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and SIP Call programs would have resulted in less uncertainty,
lower price volatility, and a smoother transition between the
programs-though at the cost of higher short-term emissions.This
balancing illustrates the tension inherent in most emissions market
transitions.
B. The NOx SIP Call and CAIR
1. CAIR
By 2003, it became clear that the contribution of the interstate
transport of NOx and SO2 emissions to particulate matter levels
was an ongoing and significant environmental problem requiring
EPA intervention.63 Responding to these concerns, the EPA in
2005 issued the Clean Air Interstate Rule, establishing cap-and
trade programs limiting annual SO2 and NOx emissions in the
eastern U.S. 64 In addition, because of a continuing concern that
many areas would fail to meet the ozone NAAQS, CAIR included
a seasonal NO, market as a successor to the NOx SIP Call program
to address the long-range downwind transport of ozone and NOx
that affect summertime ozone levels.6 5
The CAIR rule esfablished stringent annual SO2 and NOx
emissions caps for roughly 30 eastern states and provided model
trading rules for a regional cap-and-trade program for SO2 and
NOx emissions from electric generating units. 66 States could elect
to adopt these rules to comply with their emissions reduction
obligations.67 While states could adopt a different approach, CAIR
was structured to give states a substantial incentive to adopt EPA's
model trading rules because EPA would manage the trading
programs based on its model trading rules (reducing the burden on
the states of administering a program). EPA also provided a draft
of a prepared SIP that required minimal effort for approval in a
63 See CAIR, supra note 5, at 25,168-69.
6 See generally id.
61 Id. at 25,165-66.
66 See generally id. To participate in the EPA-administered trading programs,
states were required to adopt EPA's model cap-and-trade rules. This requirement
provided states with the flexibility to modify sections regarding NOx allocations
and adopt individual-uriit opt-in provisions. Id. at 25,274.
61 States were given the flexibility to modify sections regarding NOx
allocations and whether to adopt individual unit opt-in provisions. See id. at
25,274. .
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context where the states faced a tight deadline for submitting their
CAIR SIPs.68
CAIR set state obligations for SO2 and NOx emissions
reductions in two phases. Phase I established caps for NOx in 2009
and for SO2 in 2010; Phase II required additional reductions for
both NO, and S02 to meet more stringent emissions caps in
2015.69 EPA projected that CAIR would achieve reductions of
more than 60 percent for NOx and more than 70 percent from 2003
emissions levels for SO2 when the program was fully
implemented.70
CAIR also set up model trading rules for annual NOx and SO2
emissions and for seasonal NOx emissions. The CAIR annual
trading rule for S02 builds on the existing Title IV program
established by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, requiring the
exchange of two Title IV SO2 allowances for every ton of SO2
emissions for 2010-2014 vintage allowances, and in the ratio of
2.86 to 1 in Phase 2 for 2015 and later vintage allowances. Under
this phased approach, earlier-vintage banked allowances (pre-
2010) would be expected to have a higher market value." The
annual CAIR NOx trading rule was new; there was no existing
annual NOx program in place. The seasonal NOx cap-and-trade
rule replaced the existing NOx SIP Call program with seasonal
68 See id. at 25,263. CAIR SIPs were due within 18 months of publication of
the rule-i.e., November 2006. SIPs to implement the ozone NAAQS were due
June 15, 2007, and SIPs to implement the PM2.5 NAAQS were due April 5,
2008. EPA argued that the tight deadline for the CAIR SIP was necessary to
allow EPA and the states to develop the SIPs needed to implement the 1997
NAAQS.
6 See id at 25,167. To implement these reductions, CAIR adopted state-
specific emissions caps and required states to adopt monitoring requirements for
their electric-utility generating units as a part of their SIPs.
7o EPA, Clean Air Interstate Rule: Basic Information,
http://www.epa.gov/cair/basic.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). Phase I of CAIR
established a 2009 NO, annual cap of 1.5 million tons and a seasonal cap of 0.6
million tons. The 2010 CAIR SO 2 emission cap for Phase I was 3.6 million tons.
In Phase II, CAIR established a 2015 NOx annual cap of 1.3 million tons and a
seasonal cap of 0.5 million tons. The 2015 CAIR SO2 cap for Phase II was 2.5
million tons. See CAIR, supra note 5, at 25,165, 25,212.
n Pre-2010 allowances would have a higher market price under CAIR
relative to post-2010 allowances. The superior exchange ratio of pre-2010
allowances would have made them more valuable than post-2010 allowances
whatever the cap in CAIR. In addition, CAIR's tighter SO2 cap also means that
pre-2010 allowances would have been-absent the D.C. Circuit decision- more
valuable in the CAIR market than they would have been in the existing Title IV
market.
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caps that were somewhat more stringent than the existing program.
The most significant changes from the NOx SIP Call seasonal
program to the CAIR program included the elimination of PFC.72
All the states included in CAIR adopted the essential elements of
EPA's model trading rules in their SIPs, and EPA now administers
the markets for these model trading programs.
After promulgation of CAIR, North Carolina and several
power companies filed challenges with the D.C. Circuit.73 After
hearing arguments on CAIR, the court issued its decision,. finding
"more than several fatal flaws in the final rule" in July 2008, and
vacated the rule in its entirety (we discuss this decision in more
detail below when we address CAIR's successor, the proposed
Transport Rule).74 The EPA responded to the Court decision by
requesting either a re-hearing on two issues or, in the alternative, a
remanding of the rule to EPA to allow the agency to address the
concerns identified in the opinion. The nominally victorious
plaintiffs supported EPA's request. 75 In response, the D.C. Circuit
took the unusual step of changing its earlier ruling and remanded
CAIR to EPA in December 2008 to allow EPA to address its legal
flaws.76 The effect of this decision is to leave CAIR in place and
require the states to comply with the provisions of CAIR, at least
until the EPA crafts a replacement rule. States had to comply with
the NOx requirements beginning in 2009 and with the SO2
requirements beginning in 2010.
2. The NOx SIP Call-CAIR Transition
A Simple Exchange
In contrast to the OTC-SIP Call transition, the process for
exchange of banked allowances between the SIP Call and CAIR
72 CAIR, supra note 5, at 25,283.
73 See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 896.
74 Id. at 901.
1 North Carolina v. EPA, No. 05-1244, Document: 01215418702 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (based on petitions for rehearing filed by both EPA and plaintiffs, the
court determined that the environmental benefits of CAIR were sufficient
grounds to preserve it while EPA repaired the flaws identified in the orginal
decision. As the court noted, "Here, we are convinced that, notwithstanding the
relative flaws of CAIR, allowing CAIR to remain in effect until it is replaced by
a rule consistent with our opinion would at least temporarily preserve the
environmental values covered by CAIR.")
76 See id at 3.
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programs was straightforward. As the EPA states in the CAIR
rulemaking, "pre-2009 NOx SIP Call allowances can be banked
into [CAIR] and used by CAIR-affected sources for compliance
with the CAIR ozone-season NOx program."77 In other words, NOx
SIP Call allowances could be exchanged one to one for CAIR
allowances-though any allowances of vintage years 2009 and
later that may have been bought in advance could not be used at
all.
Note that this one-to-one exchange for allowances applied
only to the seasonal NOx emissions-trading program within CAIR.
CAIR also created an annual program. Since there was no
comparable existing program, no transfer of banked allowances
was possible.
However, EPA did provide a program to support early
reductions in annual NOx emissions through a CSP. The CSP-
similar in structure to the earlier program provided in the NOx SIP
Call-consisted of 200,000 tons of NOx allowances. The CSP
allowances were distributed to the states on a pro-rata basis and
were to be used either to address certain "hardship" cases where a
utility was unable to meet the January 1, 2009, deadline or to be
distributed among sources making early reductions.78
EPA originally proposed to establish only an annual CAIR
NOx program-ending the seasonal NBP created by the SIP Call-
because the annual NOx limit would reduce "NOx emissions
sufficiently enough to not warrant a regional ozone season NOx
cap."79 Indeed, EPA projected that the CAIR annual NOx program
would dominate the seasonal NO, trading program, so that the
seasonal CAIR program would have a surplus of NOx allowances,
prices for seasonal NOx allowances would be zero, and there
would be little or no banking.80 At the final rule stage, however,
EPA reversed course and established a seasonal NOx cap-and-trade
market even though EPA modeling continued to project that the
n See CAIR, supra note 5, at 25,274.
7 Distribution of the CSP was based on each state's share of final NOx
reductions required by CAIR. See id. at 25,286.
7 See id at 25,256.
8 EPA developed its analysis using the Integrated Planning Model, a multi-
regional, dynamic, deterministic linear programming model of the U.S. electric
power sector. See id. at 25,196. See also EPA, CAIR 2004 Final: Regional
Summary Report, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progsregs/epa-ipm/cair/docs/
cair2004_final.zip (last visited Aug. 26, 2010).
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annual NOx market would dominate NOx control decisions and the
price of NOx allowances in the seasonal market would be zero.
EPA noted that commenters remained very concerned that the
CAIR annual NOx program would not be sufficient to assure the
reductions required for ozone attainment. In its final rule, EPA
recognized that a seasonal cap would provide certaintyf' and
agreed that was "very important in the. effort to help areas achieve
ozone attainment."8 2
Other studies predicted, however, that the seasonal CAIR cap
would continue to be binding (even with the CAIR annual NOx
program) and projected positive seasonal NOx allowance prices.83
In addition, as noted above, electric utilities have a strong
incentive to maintain a reserve of banked allowances to provide
operational flexibility. Data available for the NBP shows that
seasonal NOx allowance prices remained positive at around $700
per ton and sources banked additional allowances-as reflected by
NOx emissions reductions below the NOx NBP emissions cap-in
the period after promulgation of the CAIR rule up to the start of
the CAIR seasonal NOx program in 2009. In the three years after
adoption of the CAIR rule (2006-2008), covered sources in the
NBP banked roughly 90,000 additional seasonal NOx allowances;
see Figure.84 These early reductions in advance of CAIR yielded
8 For reasons of chemistry, tropospheric ozone is essentially a summer-
season problem; in EPA's opinion, therefore, a seasonal cap would focus the
trading program more directly on summertime emissions that are most likely to
have adverse health effects.
82 Id. at 25,256. The CAIR rulemaking and related documents do not offer
much additional explanation for the decision to allow a simple one-to-one
exchange for banked seasonal NOx allowances. The final CAIR rule simply notes
that the one-to-one exchange is consistent with its proposal and final action with
respect to the treatment of Title IV SO2 allowances. However, since EPA
believed that the annual market would dominate the seasonal market and that
banking would have a negligible role, the agency had little reason to be
concerned with the transfer of banked NOx allowances to the CAIR seasonal NOx
market. See id. at 25,227 (tables indicate EPA models showed that drawdown of
pre-CAIR banked allowances would result in emissions exceeding the rule's
annual caps, but not its seasonal caps).
8 Karen Palmer, Dallas Burtraw & Jhih-Shyang Shih, The Benefits and
Costs of Reducing Emissions in the Electricity Sector, 83 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 115,
124-25 (2009).
8 See EPA, NOx Budget Trading Program: Compliance and Environmental
Results (2005-2008), http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progress/progress-
reports.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2010). The EPA reports that sources
transferred a total bank of 275,000 NOx NBP allowances-the post CAIR-
announcement emissions reductions combined with banked emissions from
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early air quality improvements in 2007 and 2008. Therefore, the
EPA's decision to create a seasonal CAIR NOx market with the
transfer of banked NBP allowances had real consequences in the
form of early reductions that were not anticipated by the EPA's
modeling.
Figure 7. Seasonal NOx Allowance Banking In the Transition
to CAIR
Allowance Prices
While prices in the seasonal NOx market experienced a
decline in 2005 and 2006, the EPA reported that the market for SIP
Call allowances continued to be active throughout the transition
period to the start of the CAIR program in 2009 (see Figure 7).
The NOx allowance price approaching the transition to the CAIR
seasonal NOx program remained relatively stable in the range of
$700 per ton up to the July 2008 D.C. Circuit decision. The
earlier years for future use in the CAIR ozone-season NOx cap-and-trade
program.
8 Id
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transition was not marked by sharp price spikes or drops for NOx
allowances in the years leading up to the CAIR seasonal NOx
market-unlike the substantial premiums for NOx allowances in
the transitions associated with establishing the earlier OTC and
NBP programs. We believe that a variety of factors account for the
stability in NOx allowance prices with this transition: the change in
the seasonal cap was relatively small, the available projections
suggested that the new cap could be met readily, and sources were
able to carry a substantial "bank" of NOx allowances (roughly 50
percent of the cap) into the new CAIR seasonal NOx program.
Figure 8. Seasonal NOx Allowance Prices, 2006-200987
IMicthty Seasoa and Annual NO. Prices
Prices for 2009 CAIR annual NOx allowances in the 15
months preceding the start of the CAIR program were high relative
to EPA estimates of the marginal cost of NO, control under CAIR.
These prices fluctuated between $3,000 and $6,000 per ton in the
forward markets prior to the July 2008 D.C. Circuit decision to
vacate CAIR and rebounded in the early months of 2009 to $4,000
86 Gary Hart, The Roller Coaster Ride of the NO, Allowance Market, 1 ICAP
ENERGY-ENVTL. MARKETS BRIEF 1, 2 (2009); see also EPA, 2009 THE NOx
BUDGET TRADING PROGRAM: 2008 EMissioN, COMPLIANCE, & MARKET DATA 3,
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/NBP_1/NBP 2008 ECM Data.pdf
(noting that emitters carried over 273,000 banked NOx allowances into CAIR).
Data provided by Gary Hart (on file with author) and supplemented by Id
at 4. Dotted lines represent periods where limited price data are available.
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per ton after the court reversed its decision and remanded the rule
to EPA (see Figure 8). In contrast, the EPA estimated marginal
costs of $1,300 per ton for NOx control in 2009.8 These high
prices for 2009 vintage NOx annual allowances reflected the
uncertainty associated with the extent to which adequate NOx
control would be in place in the first year of the CAIR program.
While acknowledging that cost increases and shortages in the
installation of NOx control influenced forward market prices, EPA
reported that risk aversion and thin markets also played a role in
driving up prices for 2009 annual NOx allowances. 89 In addition,
the D.C. Circuit's decisions in July and December of 2008
contributed to the volatility of prices and uncertainty in the market.
III. BANKED ALLOWANCES AND PROGRAM TRANSITIONS: SO 2
A. Title IV Phases I and II
1. Title IV Program Structure
As discussed briefly in Part ILA above, one of the most
significant innovations in the 1990 CAA amendments was
Congress' explicit and detailed creation of a cap-and-trade system
for SO2 emissions. The program is implemented in Title IV of the
CAA (the program is commonly referred to as the Title IV
program). Title IV itself is quite detailed, including specific
emissions caps and a detailed table of allocations to individual
emissions sources. 90 Unlike the EPA NOx programs discussed
above, Title IV is a nationwide program.91
The program included two phases. In Phase I, in effect from
1995 to 1999, the 263 largest SO2 emissions sources were required
to reduce emissions by about 3.5 million tons per year.92 This was
achieved by allocating a declining number of allowances to these
sources over the course of Phase I (see Figure 9). Emitters were
free to buy and sell allowances, but were required to surrender one
See CAIR, supra note 5, at 25,209.
89 CLEAN AIR MKTS. Div., EPA, UPDATE ON CAP AND TRADE PROGRAMS FOR
SO2 AND NOx 17-18 (2007), http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/presentations/docs/
ema07/Napolitano%2OFall%20EMA%20-%2011.29.07.pdf.
90 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a), § 7651c(e).
91 With the exception of Alaska and Hawaii. See § 765la(14).
92 ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 6.
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for each ton of SO2 emissions at the end of each year. Banking was
permitted, but borrowing was not-allowances of a previous
vintage year could be used, but those of future vintage years could
not.9 3
In Phase II, in effect beginning in 2000, the Title IV program
expanded to include almost all fossil fuel electricity generating
plants.94 The Phase i cap was greater than the Phase I cap to
account for the inclusion of many new sources, but similarly
declined over time before leveling off at 9.5 million tons of SO2
emissions per year. (see Figure 9).
Figure 9. SO2 Emissions under the Acid Rain Program95
2. Banking in Title IV and the Phase I-Phase II Transition
As Figure 9 indicates, the SO2 emissions sources regulated in
Phase I of the Title IV program substantially overcomplied with
the cap, creating a large bank of allowances before the program
expanded in Phase II. The early years of Phase II were marked by
a draw-down of this bank, with emissions slightly exceeding the
cap until 2006. From 2006 on, emissions continued to decline and
9 The availability of banking (and not borrowing) is concisely established by
the definition of Title IV allowances. See § 7651a(3) (stating that "the term
'allowance' means an authorization ... to emit, during or after a specified
calendar year, one ton of sulfur dioxide.").
94 See § 7651d(a).
95 EPA, 2008 EMISSION COMPLIANCE AND MARKET ANALYSES (2009),
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progress/ARP_2.html.
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increasing numbers of allowances were banked.96
The transition of banked allowances between Phase I and
Phase II was simple. In fact, it is somewhat inaccurate to call it a
transition at all: allowances banked by Phase I sources could be
used on a 1:1 basis by those sources in Phase II, sold, or held in
reserve with no penalty. Indeed there is no such thing as a "Phase I
allowance" or "Phase II allowance"-the only thing distinguishing
the two is the vintage year, which has no impact on the
relationship between allowances and emissions. To the extent that
the two Phases can be considered a banked-allowance transition,
the exchange ratio between the two was 1:1. Since the transition
between the phases was understood even before the Title IV
program began in 1995, there was no chance of unsettled
expectations during the transition.
This transition is different from those discussed above
between EPA NOx programs (and that discussed below between
Title IV and CAIR) in that the EPA had relatively little discretion
over the structure of the Title IV program-and no discretion over
the exchange ratio between the phases-because these details were
specified by Congress in the CAA itself. Title IV allowances are
created by statute, and the relationship between them and SO2
emissions is fixed at 1:1.97 Because of this legal limitation, the
Phase I-Phase II transition provides no insight into the EPA's
policy preferences for transition of banked allowances. It does,
however, supply some evidence that simple, 1:1 exchange ratios
contribute to market stability.
3. The Title IV Market During the Phase I-Phase II Transition
The simple transition of banked allowances between the two
phases of the Title IV program was associated with the relatively
smooth operation of the Title IV allowance market. The
availability of the significant bank created in Phase I enabled
sources to exceed the Phase II cap in the short term. If this had not
been possible, the incorporation of a large number of new sources
in Phase II may have resulted in a significant spike in allowance
prices. Between 1998 and 2001, prices fluctuated around the $100-
$200 range, but the changes were neither abrupt nor dramatic (see
Figure 10). Thus, the 1:1 transition and availability of an
96 id
9 See § 7651a(3).
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allowance bank likely served to moderate price volatility in this
transition.9
Figure 10. SO2 Allowance Prices, 1994-200499
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From an environmental perspective, the transition of banked
Phase I allowances into Phase II made substantial early emissions
reductions possible, with corresponding benefits to the public'00-
though environmental groups might also criticize the "windfall"
revenues Phase I sources received from using selling banked
allowances in Phase II. Phase I sources banked allowances in each
year; had these allowances not been useful in Phase II, or had they
been subject to a limited exchange, these early reductions would
have likely been smaller. While the early years of Phase II were
marked by a draw-down of the bank created in Phase I (and,
9 It is not possible to determine to what extent the relative stability of the
Title IV allowance market was due to the availability of banked allowances
rather than other factors. Unlike most other emissions market transitions
discussed in this paper, the transition to Phase II involved not a declining cap but
the addition of a large number of additional sources. The marginal cost of
controlling emissions under Phase II therefore could have been substantially
different (and harder for the market to predict). The fact that prices remained
relatively stable through 2003 likely has much to do with continuity in these
underlying costs, though the presence of the bank still probably moderated the
transition.
99 Dallas Burtraw et al., Economics ofPollution Trading for SO2 and NO, 15(RFF Discussion Paper 05-05, 2005), available at http://www.rff.org/
publications/pages/publicationdetails.aspx?publicationid= 7379.
100 See ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 320 (stating that "[e]missions were
reduced well beyond what was required to meet the Phase I cap, without new
legislation or regulation, because these reductions were cheap ex post and
because the allowances thus saved could be banked for use in Phase II, when
marginal compliance cost was expected to be higher.").
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therefore, emissions above the Phase II cap), the emissions trend
continued downward and, with the adoption of CAIR, sources
began to bank SO2 allowances once again in anticipation of the
new, more stringent CAIR caps (see discussion in the next
section). At no point during the Title IV program has the bank of
emissions allowances been exhausted.
As Figure 10 (above) and Figure 11 (below) indicate, the
price stability that characterized the Phase I-Phase II transition was
only upset when the EPA began to consider modifications to Title
IV in CAIR to address environmental problems associated with
interstate transport of SO 2.
B. Title IVand CAIR
As discussed above, by 2003, it had become clear that the
contribution of the interstate transport of NOx and SO2 emissions
to particulate matter levels was an ongoing and significant
environmental problem requiring EPA intervention.o'0 Responding
to these concerns, the EPA in 2005 issued the Clean Air Interstate
Rule, establishing cap-and trade programs limiting annual SO2 and
NOx emissions in the eastern U.S. Just as it acted to preserve the
value of banked NOx allowances in the CAIR program, the EPA
also adopted a phased approach in the exchange rate per ton of
S02 emissions for Title IV S02 allowances to avoid significantly
undermining the value of banked allowances under the CAA Title
IV SO2 (acid rain) program. Firms subject to this program had
been free to bank allowances since the inception of the program in
1995. Under CAIR, the EPA proposed significant cuts in SO2
emissions caps, creating similar challenges to those created by
lowering NO, caps in other program transitions.
In CAIR, the EPA required regulated sources to use Title IV
allowances to comply with the new, stricter CAIR caps by
increasing the number of such allowances sources had to surrender
for each ton of SO2 emissions.
1. Transition of Title IVAllowances
The EPA's approach to this transition was similar to that
taken in CAIR for the seasonal- NOx program-the existing
exchange relationship of 1:1 for banked allowances was preserved
101 See CAIR, supra note 5, at 25,168-69.
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through 2009, while 2010 vintage (and later) allowances would be
exchanged at a ratio other than 1:1.102 Specifically, each allowance
of vintage 2009 and earlier could be exchanged for one ton of SO2
emitted after 2009-that is, an exchange ratio of one to one. CAIR
required an exchange of two Title IV allowances of 2010-2014
vintage for each ton of S02 emitted. After 2014, CAIR required an
exchange of 2.86 allowances per ton of S02 emitted.'03 Since the
final CAIR rulemaking was published in 2005, this provided a
four-year adjustment period. With the one-to-one exchange of pre-
2010 allowances, CAIR created an important incentive for early
reductions. EPA projected that "[t]hese reductions take place on a
glide slope that includes early emissions reductions as well as
some use of the SO2 allowance bank as sources gradually reduce
emissions toward the cap levels."l04
EPA projected that covered sources would significantly
reduce SO2 emissions in the years prior to 2010105 and carry a
substantial bank of over 12 million Title IV allowances into the
CAIR SO2 cap-and-trade program. 0 6 Early reductions before 2010
(after the EPA issued CAIR) would improve air quality in
nonattainment areas and help some of these areas reach attainment
in advance of the 2010 deadline for the fine PM NAAQS.o 7
However, the EPA also estimated that with the resulting "glide
slope," SO2 emissions in 2010 and 2015 would exceed the Phase I
and Phase II caps in CAIR by roughly 1.5 million tons. 08
Data available on SO2 emissions over the 2005-2008
transition period show significant reductions in emissions as the
utility sector approaches the 2010 Phase I cap (see Figure 8). This
pattern of emissions reductions is consistent with EPA's projection
of a "glide path" as electric generating units approach the Phase I
cap. Over the period 2006-2008, electric utilities banked more
than 2.5 million tons of Title IV allowances. At the end of 2008,
the total bank was 8.6 million Title IV allowances-that is, the
102 See CAIR, supra note 5, at 25,258.
103 Id.
" Id. at 25,284.
105 Id.
1o6 See EPA, Federal Implementation Plans To Reduce Interstate Transport of
Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,210, 45,338 (Aug. 2, 2010)
[hereinafter Transport Rule].
107 See CAIR, supra note 5, at 25,228.
.os See id. at 25,226-27.
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existing bank (in 2005) plus the additional post-2005 (CAIR-
related) reductions in advance of the Phase I SO2 cap.109 Thus, the
provisions governing the transition from Title IV (including the
provision for one-to-one exchange of banked pre-2010 vintage
allowances in CAIR) worked as expected to yield early reductions
in SO2 emissions.
However, the D.C. Circuit found fault with this approach in
its North Carolina v. EPA decision because it changed the
relationship specified in Title IV of the CAA of one allowance for
one ton of emissions." 0 While the allowances in the NOx OTC and
SIP Call programs were created by EPA regulation, SO2
allowances are specifically created by statute-Title IV of the
Clean Air Act."' The court ruled that the EPA lacked statutory
authority to "terminate or limit" these allowances.1 2 Since the
court later remanded CAIR and charged the EPA with revising it,
2010 and 2011 Title IV allowances must be used at a 2:1 exchange
ratio for compliance with CAIR until that rule is replaced.
In light of the court's ruling, however, it appears that
congressional action is required to modify the exchange ratio of
Title IV allowances in the future. For this reason, the EPA's
recently proposed replacement for CAIR, the Transport Rule,
avoids this problem by creating an entirely new program and
prohibiting any carryover of Title IV SO2 allowances to the new
program1 3 (see Section IV.A). Nevertheless, the EPA's interim
approach in the CAIR rule for Title IV SO2 allowances provides a
relevant example-however truncated-of the treatment of banked
allowances between emissions-trading markets.
2. Allowance Prices
With the adoption of the final CAIR rule in March 2005, the
SO2 Title IV allowance market became the CAIR SO2 market, at
09 EPA, 2008 EMISSION COMPLIANCE AND MARKET ANALYSES , supra note
95.
"o See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 922, (ruling that EPA "lacks
authority to terminate or limit Title IV allowances, either through a trading
program under section 11 0(a)(2)(D) ... or by requiring that SIPs have allowance
retirement provisions").
.. See 42 U.S.C. § 765lb(a)(1) (stating that the EPA must allocate emissions
allowances to SO2 emitters).112 See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 922.
113 See Transport Rule, supra note 106, at 45,338.
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least for those states included in CAIR. Actual price behavior for
SO2 Title IV allowances has been characterized by a period of
relative stability from 2006 through to the 2008 D.C. Circuit
decision, bookended by two periods of marked price volatility."14
(see Figure 10). Over the period 2004-2005, Title IV SO2 prices
were volatile with a sharp rise in prices at the end of 2005. The
EPA has attributed this volatility to the uncertainty associated with
the rulemaking process in adopting the more stringent CAIR
requirements." 5 The agency also reported that other market factors
played an important role in the sharp rise in prices in 2005-citing
the effect of hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the associated sharp
rise in natural gas prices.1 6 Others have also pointed to these
hurricanes as key factors in this increase in allowance prices.' 17
Title IV allowance prices dropped back and steadied in the range
of $400-$600 per allowance for 2006 and 2007-a level
commensurate with EPA's estimate of CAIR SO2 allowance
prices.1
Thus, even though CAIR established a significantly more
stringent cap for SO2, the SO2 market was relatively stable-at
least up to the July 2008 court decision-because there was a well-
established market and a substantial pool of banked SO2
allowances available to smooth the transition.
However, The D.C. Circuit Court decision in July 2008-as
revised in December 2008 to remand the CAIR rule to EPA-
resulted in an additional period of volatility with a sharp drop in
Title IV allowance prices to roughly $70 per allowance in 2009."
As with the transition discussed above to CAIR NOx markets,
a reduction in uncertainty would likely have reduced price
114 By early 2008, the leading candidates of both major parties were on the
record as supporting some form of climate policy; a position that had significant
implications for the use of coal-fired powerplants. This may have been a factor
explaining the decline in S02 allowance prices in 2008 prior to the D.C. Court
decision.
"5 EPA, ALLOWANCE MARKETS ASSESSMENT: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE TWO
BIGGEST PRICE CHANGES IN THE FEDERAL S02 AND NOX ALLOWANCE MARKETS
3 (2009), http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/resource/docs/marketassessmnt.pdf.
116 Id. at 5.
117 Burtraw et al., supra note 18, at 10.
"' In 2007, EPA estimated that the 2010 price for an SO2 allowance at a one-
to-one exchange rate would be on the order of $533 per ton. See EPA, supra note
89, at 13.
"9 See EPA, supra note 95.
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volatility. The most significant source of this uncertainty, however,
was the D.C. Circuit's ruling in North Carolina v. EPA. By
creating uncertainty about whether banked Title IV allowances
could be used in the CAIR program(a concern that was eventually
confirmed by the EPA in CAIR's successor, discussed in Section
IV. A below), the court decision resulted in a disruptive loss of
confidence in the long-run viability of Title IV SO2 allowances and
a corresponding drop in prices. In retrospect, it appears the EPA
could have done little to avert this; its planned transition in the
CAIR rule, with one-to-one exchange of pre-2010 vintage Title IV
allowances and a phased reduction in the exchange ratio beginning
in 2010, would almost certainly have been smoother.
Figure 11. Monthly SO2 Allowance Prices, 2005-2008 120
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IV. POSSIBLE FUTURE TRANSITIONS
The D.C. Circuit's rejection of CAIR in North Carolina v.
120 Data provided by Gary Hart, supplemented by EPA, CAP AND TRADE
PROGRAMS: AN UPDATE 10 (2007), http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/presentations/
docs/EMA2007.pdf.
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EPA has created substantial uncertainty about future regulation of
NOx and SO2 emissions through emissions-trading programs.
Members of Congress and the EPA have both reacted to this
uncertainty with proposals for new cap-and-trade programs for
these pollutants. The EPA has issued a proposed Transport Rule
under existing CAA authority to replace CAIR and comply with
the court decision. Two senators (along with 18 co-sponsors) have
proposed a bill that would codify CAIR in the short term and
create new national and regional cap-and-trade programs for SO2,
NOx, and mercury beginning in 2012.
While neither proposal has been implemented and either
could change significantly before being finalized or passed,
discussing them is still useful. Both proposals would create new
markets and therefore face questions about transition from current
programs and the treatment of banked allowances from those
existing markets. Despite addressing the same underlying
problems with CAIR, the two proposals take vastly divergent
approaches to the transition question.
A. EPA's CAIR Replacement: the Proposed Transport Rule
The EPA issued its proposed Transport Rule on August 2,
2010, almost exactly two years after the initial ruling in North
Carolina v. EPA.121 The rule, when and if it is finalized, would
replace CAIR. Like CAIR before it, the Transport Rule would
create new cap-and-trade programs: two programs for SO2 (one for
core coal-using states and another for peripheral states), one for
ozone-season NOx, and one for annual NOx. It is almost entirely a
creature of the North Carolina v. EPA decision in that most of its
provisions are carefully worded and constructed so as to comply
with the holdings in that case. Perhaps most notably, the rule
would sharply restrict or eliminate interstate trading of SO2 and
NOx allowances because the EPA determined that doing so would
be the only way to comply with the court's requirement that each
state's emissions not interfere with NAAQS compliance in
downwind states.
1. . Transition ofBanked Allowances
Each equivalent CAIR program allowed the continued
banking of allowances. These existing banks are substantial: 12
121 Transport Rule, supra note 113 at 45,210.
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million tons of SO2 (Title IV) allowances, 600,000 ozone-season
NOx allowances, and 720,000 annual NOx allowances. 122 As the
EPA puts it, "Substantial emissions reductions have occurred as a
result of the CAIR programs. These reductions are greater than
were expected when the rule was promulgated."' 23
Because of its concern with the size of these banks, the EPA
proposes not to allow exchange of CAIR or Title IV SO2
allowances into the Transport Rule programs at all. For SO2
allowances, the agency cites specific reasons for its legal
concerns. 124 As discussed in Part III.B.2 above, the EPA attempted
in the CAIR rule to provide a continuing role for existing Title IV
allowances in the new CAIR SO2 market (by requiring the
exchange of two or more Title IV allowances for each ton of SO2
emissions in the CAIR region). The North Carolina v. EPA court
rejected this approach, holding that the EPA lacked authority under
the CAA to modify the 1:1 relationship between Title IV
allowances and tons of SO 2 emissions specified in the CAA. Any
attempt by the EPA to modify this in the Transport Rule would
presumably be deemed illegal as well. This is a somewhat perverse
result because the tighter SO2 cap created by the Transport Rule in
the 27 states it covers would render Title IV allowances held by
emitters largely valueless 125-seemingly a more significant
interference than modifying the statutorily-specified relationship or
exchanging Title IV allowances for new Transport Rule
allowances would be. Nevertheless, the result of North Carolina
appears to be that the EPA has the authority to create a new SO2
trading program but no authority to allow the use of Title IV SO2
allowances in that new program with an exchange ratio that differs
from 1:1.
It is not clear from the North Carolina decision and EPA's
legal analysis in the Transport Rule why the agency would be
unable to base allocation of new Transport Rule S02 allowances
on the volume of banked Title IV allowances held. Such an
approach would be conceptually and perhaps practically similar to
the Compliance Supplement Pool system used in the OTC-NOx
122 Id. at 45,338-39.
123 Id. at 45,338.
124 id.125
125 Title IV allowances might not be entirely without value since those
allocated for emissions above the Transport Rule cap amount could be traded to
emitters in states not covered by the transport rule.
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SIP Call and SIP Call-CAIR seasonal NOx transitions. This would
not modify the relationship between Title IV allowances and tons
of emissions specified in the CAA since emitters would still hold
and use their Title IV allowances, but could preserve the
expectations embodied in banked Title IV allowances in a new
form for use in complying with tighter Transport Rule emissions
caps.
A counterargument is that such a move would be a too-clever-
by-half rebranding of the same meddling with Title IV allowances
that the North Carolina court rejected. Nevertheless, it would be a
much more modest interference with Title IV allowances than the
Transport Rule as written would be. If compliance with the spirit
as well as the letter of Title IV is required, such a CSP approach
would be problematic, but so would the Transport rule's treatment
of S02 allowances, as EPA projects that Title IV allowances will
trade at market prices close to zero.
Somewhat surprisingly, the EPA also proposes prohibiting
any exchange of CAIR NOx allowances for either the seasonal or
annual markets. This decision, in contrast to that for SO2
allowance exchange, appears to be driven not by legal necessity,
but by policy preference-though the agency also cites some legal
concerns (more modest than those identified for SO2
allowances).126 In the proposed rule, the EPA states that the size
"of the banks are so large that they might significantly reduce the
amount of emissions reductions that would otherwise be achieved
in the proposed Transport Rule NOx programs, particularly in the
earlier years[.]"l 2 7 In response to these concerns, the EPA sets out
a predictable set of options for banked allowance exchange: one-
to-one exchange, less than one-to-one exchange, and no
exchange.128 The agency has selected no exchange as its proposed
126 Specifically, the agency points out that the method for allocation of
allowances in the Transport Rule would differ from the "fuel-adjustment factors"
method used in CAIR and struck down by the D.C. Circuit. The EPA claims
"some parties" may feel that allowing one-to-one exchange of banked CAIR NOx
allowances would advantage those sources who received more allowances under
the CAIR allocation method than under the Transport Rule method and who
banked substantial numbers of CAIR NOx allowances (primarily coal plants).
The agency does not claim that it lacks the legal authority to implement a one-to-
one exchange of NOx allowances, however-whereas it does make such a claim
regarding SO2 allowances. See Transport Rule, supra note 106, at 45,339.
127 id.
128 id.
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option, stating that it "would avoid the potential legal and practical
problems raised by the other approaches."1 29
Regulated entities were not totally without warning of this
move: Sam Napolitano, director of the EPA's Clean Air Markets
Division, notified them via email and the EPA website in March of
2009 that "EPA's continued recording of CAIR NO, allowances
does not guarantee or imply that any allowances will continue to
be usable for compliance after a replacement rule is finalized or
that they will continue to have value in the future."' 30 This
information may have tempered expectations about the value of
allowances banked in 2009 and 2010, but regulated entities had no
such warning for CAIR allowances banked before then.
The decision not to transition banked NOx allowances at all is
only thinly justified and is at odds with the EPA's traditional
attitude toward banked allowances (as illustrated by the inter-
program transitions discussed above). Each successive NOx trading
program has included more stringent caps on NOx emissions, but
only in the Transport Rule has the EPA deemed allowance banks a
sufficient threat to achievement of planned reductions to justify
blocking exchange entirely. If the proposed Transport Rule is
implemented, emissions will likely increase in the short term as
emitters must "use or lose" banked allowances and lack incentive
to make early emissions reductions. While it is less certain, it is
possible that prohibiting the exchange of banked allowances would
result in lower long-term banking of allowances and a broader loss
of buy-in to cap-and-trade systems.
2. Allowance Prices
After the EPA announced the proposed Transport Rule, NOx
129 The EPA's decision to present a variety of options may indicate that it is at
least open to some exchange of banked allowances, despite its stated preference
for no exchange. Prospects for one-to-one exchange are dim at best, however. In
fact, even if the EPA were to select a one-to-one exchange, "assurance
provisions" in the Transport Rule markets designed to ensure that each state
achieves a planned level of reductions would likely apply. These provisions
would force surrender of allowances if state emissions exceeded a set level,
indirectly reducing the value of the total allowance allocation provided to each
emitter, if not the banked allowances themselves. These assurance provisions
also might affect emitters other than those that had chosen to exchange and then
draw down banked allowances, a concern that the EPA mentions when
discussing one-to-one exchange in its proposed rule. See id.
130 EPA, Trading of CAIR Allowances, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/business/
cairallowancestatus.html.
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and SO2 prices fell in response to the EPA proposal to prohibit the
transfer of banked allowances to the new Transport Rule programs.
CAIR annual NOx allowances dropped from $465 to $200 per ton
in the following days-a drop of more than 50 percent. CAIR SO2
allowances dropped from $15 per ton to around $3-4 per ton.131
Allowance prices then rebounded to some extent-perhaps in part
because of hopes that some variant of the Senate bill will pass, 132
possibly as a component of broader energy legislation. They
have since fallen again; prices as of October 2011 are about $1-2
per ton for a 2011 vintage SO2 allowance and $75 per ton for a
2011-vintage annual NOx allowance.' 34
B. The "Three-Pollutant" Bill
North Carolina has led some in Congress to advocate
legislation that would give the EPA new regulatory authority to
implement a CAIR-style cap-and-trade program. Senators Tom
Carper (D-Del.) and Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.) have proposed
one such bill, S. 2995, though it failed to pass in 2010.1' This bill
would have reduced emissions of three regulated pollutants-SO2,
NOx, and mercury-and is accordingly referred to as the "three-
pollutant" or "3P" bill. The bill would largely codify CAIR in the
short term (until 2012), abrogating North Carolina v. EPA. After
2012, it would establish new EPA-administered cap-and-trade
programs to achieve further SO2 and NOx emissions reductions.
These programs would start in 2012 and supplant the existing
131 Jennifer Zajac, Outlook 'Very Bleak' for SO2, NO, Markets; Carper-
Alexander Holds Promise, SNL FINANCIAL (July 14, 2010),
http://www.snl.comlnteractiveX/article.aspx?CDID=A- 11442921-
13873&KPLT=2.
132 See discussion infra Part V.B.
133 One market observer suggests that extreme summer heat in 2010 and
associated increased demand for electricity has contributed to the increase in
annual NOx prices. But this observer states that "[a]nnual NOx prices should
trend downward because the allowances will lose their value after 2011."
EVOLUTION MARKETS, NEW CLEAN AIR RULES TAKE MARKETS ON A DETOUR
(AUG. 10,2010), http://new.evomarkets.com/pdf documents/New%20Clean%20
Air%20Rules%2OTake%2OMarkets%20on%20a%2ODetour.pdf.
134 Evolution Markets Homepage, http://new.evomarkets.com/ (last visited
October 20, 2011).
"s S. 2995, 111th Cong. (2010). The bill has a number of co-sponsors as well.
See Press Release, Sens. Carper, Alexander Introduce Bill to Clean Air, Protect
Public Health and Promote Job Creation (Feb. 4, 2010),
http://carper.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=322121 (last visited August 26,
2010).
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programs created by Title IV and CAIR.136 This would obviously
create a transition between the existing and new markets and
require decisions about the treatment of banked allowances.
The bill does address the issue of banked allowance transition
directly: the treatment of banked SO2 and NOx allowances is not
left to EPA discretion. In general, existing banked allowances can
be used on a one-to-one basis in the 3P markets. This parallels the
transition discussed above between NBP and CAIR, and the fact
that it is specified explicitly in the bill may reflect Congress's
awareness that preserving existing banked allowance value is
important.'37
For NOx, the 3P bill would create a new annual cap-and-trade
program supplanting the interim CAIR annual market. Allowances
banked under the CAIR market could be exchanged on a one-to-
one basis in the new 3P system.138 For SO2, the bill would create a
market replacing the Title IV trading system created by the 1990
CAA amendments. Transition of banked allowances between these
two markets is slightly more complex. Banked allowances of
vintage year 2009 or earlier could be exchanged in the new market
on a one-to-one basis. Banked vintage 2010 or later allowances
could also be exchanged in the new market, but only at two to
one.139
This more complex transition is very similar to that specified
in CAIR for SO2 allowances, as discussed in Section III.B above.
The reason for treating the two classes of allowances differently is
simple: it preserves the exchange ratio of allowances as understood
by market participants at the time those allowances were banked,
while allowing the agency to pursue environmental goals more
aggressively in future time periods. If the 3P bill had passed in the
S. 2995, 111th Cong. §417 (2010). The bill would largely codify CAIR in
the short term, overturning the North Carolina v. EPA decision.
1 This sentiment may extend beyond the senators who wrote and sponsored
the bill in its original form. A series of changes to the 3P bill proposed by
Senator George Voinovich (R-Ohio) would substantially alter core elements of
the bill but would leave the treatment of banked allowances intact. See John
Walke, Dirty Power: Attack on Clean Air Protections Planned in Senate, NRDC
SWTICHBOARD BLOG (July 27, 2007), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/jwalke/
dirty_power explosiveattacko.html (citing Amendments to S. 2995, 111th
Cong. (2010), available at http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/jwalke/2010/07/27/
Voinovich%20Amendments%20to%2oCarper-Alexander/o2Obill.pdf).
1s S. 2995, 111th Cong. § 419(f)(5)(A) (2010).
'9 S. 2995, 111th Cong. § 418(d)(5) (2010).
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11 1h Congress, participants would have been fully aware in
advance that post-2010 vintage allowances would be subject to a
two-to-one exchange ratio in the new future market. If the bill is
reconsidered, it is likely that the start dates of the new trading
markets and the cutoff vintage year for one-to-one exchange of
banked allowances would be changed to reflect the expectations
created by banking of 2010 and later allowances, but the principles
discussed above could easily be maintained.
While the 3P legislation would address the immediate issues
with CAIR that flow out of the 2008 North Carolina decision, it
does not address likely future EPA actions under other CAA
provisions: § 11 0(a)(2)(D), § 129, and § 112. In order to establish a
viable, longer-term cap-and-trade program for NOx and SO2, this
legislation would need to address these other CAA requirements.
Otherwise, future EPA actions would likely require substantial
emission reductions that would effectively preempt the 3P caps.
CONCLUSIONS
In our discussion above, we noted that emissions allowances
do not convey full-fledged property rights but instead carry some
(but not all) of the rights in the property bundle. One key element
in the property bundle is the extent to which banked emissions
allowances hold value as emissions caps decline and new
programs are created. Our discussion of the transition between
cap-and-trade programs for NOx and SO2 highlights this issue.
State policies, EPA policies, and federal court decisions have
limited the use of banked allowances over the course of these
programs, significantly altering their value and introducing a
substantial element of uncertainty in the markets for emissions
allowances. The decision by the OTC states to "sunset" 1999
vintage NOx allowances, the D.C. Circuit decision to vacate the
CAIR rule, and the EPA's recent proposed Transport Rule to
replace CAIR have each had impact on the value of NOx and SO2
allowances and the stability of allowance markets.
There is a tension between the environmental objectives of
these cap-and-trade programs and their operational efficiency. The
EPA's traditional position has been that it ". . strives to make
these markets as efficient, effective and transparent as possible to
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realize the greatest reductions at lowest cost,"1 40 and it further
claims to recognize that a ". . gradual phase-in of new programs to
lower emissions should reduce price jumps."l 4' But the EPA's
recent proposal to prohibit the transfer of banked allowances from
the CAIR NOx markets to the Transport Rule represents a shift in
the opposite direction that can only be detrimental to the overall
efficiency of the EPA's cap-and-trade programs.
One lesson of this history is that transitions to new trading
programs can be difficult, as reflected by the high reported prices
for allowances in the months preceding the startup of new
programs. These high prices were associated with uncertainty
within the regulated industry over the availability of allowances.
Observers have reported that the initiation of new environmental
programs brings some degree of "fear" and "uncertainty" to the
regulated community.142 The transition periods have been
characterized by thin markets (i.e., there are relatively few
transactions) and little or no mechanism for price discovery. 43
Substantial price volatility in these new markets-the OTC NOx
market (1999), the transition to the NBP (2003), and the CAIR
annual NOx market (2009)-adversely affect trading activity and
the overall efficiency of the program.
In contrast to these three "difficult" transitions, the transitions
between Phases I and II of Title IV, and in the SIP Call and Title
IV SO2 markets following the adoption of the CAIR rule, were
relatively orderly-at least up to the D.C. Circuit Court decision in
July 2008. The reasons are readily apparent: the markets were
well-established, a substantial pool of banked allowances could be
transferred into the new phase or program on a one-to-one basis,
and expectations with respect to future control measures were
relatively settled.
A second lesson in this historical record is that regulators
sometimes consider the rights embodied in banked emissions
allowances to be subordinate to the environmental requirements of
140 EPA, ALLOWANCE MARKETS ASSESSMENT, supra note 115, at 10.
141 id
142 Hart, supra note 86, at 2; see also id. at 5-9.
143 See Farrell, Review of Market Based Incentives, supra note 36, at 19-20;
see also ALEX FARRELL, EMissioNs MARKETS-CHARACTERISTICS AND
EVOLUTION at 20 (2005), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-500-
2005-024/CEC-500-2005-024.PDF; EPA, ALLOWANCE MARKETS ASSESSMENT,
supra note 115, at 7-8.
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these programs. The states' 1999 OTC "sunset" is one example,
but EPA's proposed Transport Rule is the most extreme, and
represents a break with the agency's historical treatment of banked
allowances during market transitions.
This has been a hard lesson to absorb. The Title IV SO2
allowances are now essentially without value-they can be
purchased for the price of a lottery ticket-representing a loss to
holders of banked allowances of $3 billion dollars. The price of
CAIR NOx allowances also has declined substantially, with an
attendant loss to holders of as much as $1 billion. With this
history, it would not be a surprise to find a loss of confidence in
banking and trading emissions allowances on the part of the
regulated community -electric utilities. Instead, each utility
system is likely to respond to future programs by switching fuels,
installing pollution control equipment, and/or adjusting their
operations in other ways to assure compliance with their emissions
caps within their own system. Thus, utilities will minimize their
reliance on banking and trading as a method of compliance, giving
up the cost savings that could be realized by a cap-and-trade
program.
More generally, real-world transitions between emissions-
trading programs are sometimes sufficiently complex that the
simplest options available for transition of banked allowances-
one-to-one exchange or no exchange-inadequately balance the
competing interests at stake. The rights created by allowances are
defined by the expectations of the emitters that choose to bank
them, and those expectations are controlled by the information the
regulator makes available. Where the regulator sets the terms of
exchange between programs in advance, as the EPA did with the
NOx SIP Call rulemaking, the regulated community has the
opportunity to adjust their emissions reduction and banking
decisions to accommodate the transition. There are no surprises
and only limited (if any) adverse effects on the trading program.
Where regulators make decisions to restrict the use of banked
allowances after a program is in place and banking decisions have
been made (as the EPA has indicated it plans to do in the proposed
Transport Rule), regulatory actions are significantly more
detrimental to the long-term performance of the emissions trading
program.
Finally, we are not ready to close the book on the history of
emissions-trading programs-particularly cap-and-trade programs.
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They have been successful in reducing pollution at relatively low
cost, and other pollutants-most notably carbon dioxide-could
well be regulated with broadly similar tools. Just as with regulation
of SO2 and NOx, these new programs will not be static. New
information about the adverse effects of emissions and the function
of markets, international agreements, and other economic and
political changes will require adjustments of these programs.
These adjustments will likely create challenges similar to those
faced by EPA in the NOx and SO2 transitions described above-
primarily, a need to strengthen caps in the face of substantial
reserves of banked allowances. Whenever such adjustments are
made, the issues discussed in this Article will arise. Allowances
will have been banked in one program, and regulators will face a
decision on how to incorporate them into its successor.
The transitions between the programs discussed here provide
evidence that these transitions are manageable-but also that
regulatory decisions affecting these transitions can have large,
disruptive effects on allowance markets if expectations of the
value of banked allowances are not respected and early reductions
go unrewarded.
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